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 Introduction 
 Social and professional networks govern our lives; they are established through 
 common education, sports interests, club memberships, as well as connections resulting 
from professional lives. Th e economics and fi nance literature has begun to give more 
attention to the infl uence of managers’ and non-executive directors’ connections on 
corporate decision-making and corporate monitoring. Indeed, it may be that profes-
sional networks have a bigger impact on corporate policy than we anticipate, and even 
infl uence the eff ectiveness of institutionalized governance structures (such as boards of 
directors) or the role of governance regulation. 
 Director networks, also known as director interlocks, are networks formed by exec-
utive and non-executive directors sitting on corporate boards. Links within director 
networks are established when two directors are sitting on the same board. Research on 
director networks emerged at the beginning of the 20th century, when director net-
works were considered a tool to foster corporate collusion. Th e following quote was 
from Louis Brandeis as the associate justice of the US Supreme Court. He made this 
statement before the passing of the Clayton Act (1913: 51), which prohibited extensive 
director networks as these could lead to collusion in concentrated industries. Th e quote 
appeared in the US House of Representatives Staff  Report to the Antitrust Committee 
(1965: 3).
 Th e practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It off ends laws 
human and divine . . . Applied to corporations which deal with each other it tends 
to disloyalty and to violation of the fundamental law that no man can serve two 
masters. In either event it tends to ineffi  ciency; for it removes incentive and destroys 
soundness of judgment. It is undemocratic for it rejects the platform: “A fair fi eld 
and no favors” ( Brandeis,  1913 ) 
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 In recent years, the number of directorships held by one individual has been capped in 
some countries. 1 However, within these legal boundaries, the power of director networks 
can still be signifi cant. In the developed countries, director networks are important 
among large corporations: one-fi ft h of the 1,000 largest companies in the US share at 
least one board member with another of the top 1,000. More than 1,000 board members 
sit on four or more corporate boards, and 235 sit on more than six (Matt  Krantz,  2002 ). 
Th e four largest oil companies have interlocking directorates with the international 
mega-banks. Exxon Mobil shares board members with JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, 
Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, and Prudential. Chevron Texaco has interlocks 
with Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase. BP Amoco shares directors with JP Morgan 
Chase. RD/Shell has ties with Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, N. M. Rothschild & Sons, 
and the Bank of England ( Henderson,  2010 ). As regulations on director networks diff er 
across countries, these cross-border director networks between powerful international 
corporations are not tightly regulated. Lastly, besides the professional connections, 
directors may also be connected by education, membership of social clubs, etc. Such 
informal director networks seem to gain in importance. 
 In this chapter, we review the history and current status and regulation of director 
networks in some major western countries in the next section. Th e academic literature 
on director networks is then summarized. Diff erent approaches to analyzing director 
networks are discussed and compared in the following section. Th e fi nal section 
concludes. 
 Director Networks in History and Today 
 Networks in the US 
 Th e earliest director network documented can be found in the incorporation documents 
of New England textile mills in the US in 1790. A small group of wealthy businessmen 
became owners of each other’s companies and could thus be called an ownership net-
work. In 1845 a larger group of 80 people, known as the “Boston Associates,” controlled 
20 percent of the textile industry. Seventeen of these men served as directors in Boston 
banks, 20 were directors in six insurance companies, and 11 were directors of fi ve rail-
road companies ( Dalzell,  1987 ). During the mid and late 19th century, director networks, 
usually led by families and large owners, became widespread in the major industries in 
the US. Banks and other fi nancial institutes were at the center of this powerful director 
network. Th is situation fi nally led to the adoption of the Clayton Act in 1914. 
 Section 8 of the Clayton Act is specifi cally designed to restrict director interlocks. At 
the beginning, director interlocks were defi ned as two competing corporations sharing 
one or more common directors. In the meantime, the act has been amended six times 
since its enactment. Today, Section 8 prohibits, with certain exceptions, any person from 
serving as a director or offi  cer in two competing corporations. In Section 8, competitor 
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corporations are defi ned as fi rms with capital, surplus, and undivided profi ts aggregat-
ing to more than $10,000,000, with the exception that no corporation is covered if the 
competitive sales of either corporation are less than $1,000,000. Section 8 does not aff ect 
companies in the banking sector. Interlocking in the banking sector is governed by 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), under “Part 348, Management offi  cial 
interlocks,” which has even more stringent rules regarding director interlocks. 
 With Section 8 of the Clayton Act outlawing a large part of director connections, 
director networks became much weaker in competitive fi rms and the banking sector. As 
a consequence of the separation of ownership and control, the networks between com-
panies in the early 1900s had become less dominated by families and bankers. Instead, 
professional managers became gradually more interlocked, a trend which continued 
until the late 1900s. Th e majority of networked directors are professional, white, male 
managers. Only recently, since the end of the 20th century, the diversifi cation of director 
networks has increased, with more women and people of color joining corporate boards. 
Although more restrictions have been put on boards, many fi rms still have large net-
works. For instance, in 2005, Citigroup had 25 links to other companies through shared 
directors. Most of these fi rms were the biggest in their sectors, such as AT&T, Ford 
Motors, PepsiCo, Time Warner, and Xerox ( Domhoff ,  2006 ). It is not surprising to hear 
the claim that the American economy is controlled by a small group of corporate elites 
from these large and connected companies. 
 Since the fi nancial crisis of 2007–8, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
is planning to enforce a new code on good corporate governance to further discourage 
multiple directorships, because serving on too many boards decreases the time and 
energy one can invest in any individual company. 
 Networks in the UK 
 Th e situation in the UK bears many similarities as fi nancial companies are also the 
most connected companies in the economy. But due to diff erences in regulation and 
culture, the development and structure of director networks diff ers from the American 
situation. 
 Th e fi rst research documenting the UK director networks is  Beesley ( 1951 ). He traced 
down the director networks existing between all companies in British Midland metal 
industries. He found that in 1948 connections had been forged between the largest com-
panies, which employed one-third of the industry’s workers. Beesley considered this 
director network a protective device to ensure that individual investment decisions 
would not be harmful to other group members. Th e coordination mechanism was, 
according to Beesley, harmful since it delayed investment in research and development. 
In recent years, director networks in the UK have been more “concise” compared to the 
US case. Directors usually do not have more than two connections with other boards. 
Th e connections between companies are oft en maintained by one common director 
( Santella et al.,  2008 ). Nevertheless,  Renneboog and Zhao ( 2011 ) still fi nd some network 
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superstars in their UK sample: Andy Hornby was sitting on four boards, while being the 
CEO in one of these fi rms in 2006. Peter Cawdron was a non-executive director or chair-
man in nine companies. Another feature of the British director networks is that there are 
connections between fi nancial institutions through common directors, since this is not 
prohibited by the UK regulation 
 Th e UK Corporate Governance Code (known as the Combined Code up to 2010) is 
a set of rules provided by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) as a guide to good 
board practice (Higgs Report, 2003). Section A proposes guidelines for the appoint-
ment of independent directors. In order to judge whether a non-executive director is 
independent, several criteria are provided. A director is not independent if he “holds 
cross- directorships or has signifi cant links with other directors through involvement in 
other companies or bodies” (A.3.1). As for executive directors, A.4.5 states: “Th e board 
should not agree to a full time executive director taking on more than one non-executive 
directorship in a FTSE 100 company nor the chairmanship of such a company” (Higgs 
Report, 2003). A.3.1 and A.4.5 strongly discourage multiple directorships but are not 
binding: should the company insist on allowing multiple directorships, a clear explana-
tion is to be given to the regulation authority as well as the investors. 
 From these elements of the regulation and codes of best practices in the US and the 
UK, it is clear that the regulatory authorities consider director networks potentially 
harmful to corporate competition, to the independence of non-executive directors, and 
the effi  ciency and responsibility of executive directors. 
 Networks in Other Developed Countries 
 Besides the US and the UK, director networks are popular in other countries too. Since 
the 1970s, director networks in Germany have come under pressure from the fi nancial 
press. According to  Prinz ( 2006 ), an overwhelming majority of the listed companies are 
connected by directors and/or fi nancial ties. He claims that infl uential director networks 
diminish the motivation to compete and restructure. Similar to the US and the UK, the 
German regulator also imposes limitations on director networks. German business leg-
islation (100, 105 AktG, since 1965) limits the number of supervisory board mandates to 
a maximum of ten seats per person, whereas a position as president of the supervisory 
board is given double weight. Moreover, mutual exchange-directorships are forbidden. 
Th ese rules eff ectively limit the growth of director networks in Germany. Nonetheless, 
 Heinze ( 2002 ) shows that, although over time there has been a quantitative reduction in 
director networks, the qualitative structure remained stable over the period of 1989 
to 2001. 
 Director networks in France are diff erent from most other countries as they are deter-
mined by the educational and political backgrounds of the directors. First, directors are 
drawn from a limited set of  Grandes Ecoles , which have powerful alumni networks. 
Second, a large proportion of the business elites are former civil servants, who have built 
connections through political relations. Th ese two networks are of overwhelming 
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importance in the French business world. ENA ( Ecole Nationale d’Administration ) and 
graduates of the  Ecoles Polytechniques run more than 20 percent of the listed fi rms, 
which accounts for around 70 percent of all assets traded on the Paris Stock Exchange. 
Twenty percent of the fi rms are run by former high-ranking bureaucrats ( Kramarz and 
Th esmar,  2006 ). To sum up, director networks in France are based on education and 
past civil service, rather than mere professional ties. 
 Director networks in Italy and Spain are strong too. Compared to the US, the UK, and 
Germany, director networks in the southern European countries show a high network 
density. In an Italian sample of 40 blue-chips in the S&P-MIB (Standard & Poor’s/Milano 
Italia Borsa) 40 index, 31 companies are connected and one out of ten directors is sitting 
on two or more boards ( Santella et al.,  2008 ). Th e ratio is similar for Spain (Crespi and 
Pascual-Fuster, 2008). On average, a Spanish director serves on 1.22 boards; some direc-
tors even sit on fi ve boards simultaneously. 
 To conclude, director networks have a long history and remain infl uential in most 
developed countries today. Th e potential harm of director networks is recognized by the 
regulatory authorities. Several restrictions have been imposed to deter excess director 
networks. However, over time director networks evolve and adapt to the new regulatory 
environment and retain their infl uence in the corporate world. In the next section, we 
review the academic literature on director networks in order to obtain more insights 
about the motivation, mechanism, and impact of director networks. 
 Research on Director Networks 
 Director Networks and Collusion 
 Concerns about director networks have attracted public and academic attention in 
Germany ( Jeidels,  1905 ) and the US since the early 1900s. Toward the end of 19th cen-
tury, the growth and concentration of some industries, for instance iron and steel 
production and railroads, induced stronger corporate connections through inter-
locking directorates. In the US the debate even triggered a government investigation 
and led to the Clayton Act in 1914, which eventually prohibited interlocking directo-
rates in the railroad industry, competing fi rms, and banks. Research on this period 
usually concentrates on the interlocks of a few large companies in the economy, ignor-
ing the networks between other companies (see e.g.  Dooley,  1969 ). As it is oft en 
argued that interlocks are a product of the development of monopolistic structures, 
studies on interlocks are embedded in antitrust research. In the mid-20th century, 
antitrust research also included investigations of the types of interlocked directors, 
company types, and whether interlocks are related to geography and industry factors 
( Mizruchi,  1982 ). Th e pioneering studies in Germany and the US were soon mim-
icked for the UK ( Aaronovitch,  1961 ) and the Netherlands ( Baruch,  1962 ).  Aaronovitch 
( 1961 ) describes the networks among British companies as an instrument used by 
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capitalists to control the industry.  Baruch ( 1962 ) documents that director networks in 
the four large Dutch banks also played a crucial role in fortifying control over a large 
range of related companies. Although the intensity of interlocking was lower in these 
countries in the early 20th century, they share many features with the German and 
American markets, such as the high interlocking level in the fi nance industry. In a 
comparative study covering the fi rst half of the 19th century,  Fennema and Schijf 
( 1978 ) report that the number of interlocks declined in the US but increased in most 
other countries. Th e most plausible explanation for this is the introduction of legal 
restrictions in the US. 
 Although regulation has tried to reduce the potential collusion of director networks, 
research has shown that director networks may also yield political infl uence. A pioneer-
ing study on director networks and fi rms’ political action is that by  Koenig ( 1979 ), who 
found that connected companies contribute more to election campaigns. Studies by 
 Mizruchi and Koenig ( 1986 ) confi rm this fi nding, but also report that interlocks via 
fi nancial institutions can be used to predict the political positions of companies. Th ey 
argue that companies interlocked through indirect ties can better coordinate with each 
other and are hence more likely to express similar positions in congressional hearings. 
Th is is contradicted by  Burris ( 1987 ). As it is likely that companies can benefi t from 
director networks involving politicians,  Agrawal and Knoeber ( 2001 ) document that 
politically experienced directors are more prevalent in companies where the costs of 
environmental regulation, sales to government, and exports are greater, and lobbying is 
more important. 
 Motivations to Create Director Networks 
 Mizruchi ( 1996 ) presents a comprehensive review of the director network studies from 
the 1970s to the 1990s. In his paper, four motivations for the establishment of networks 
are developed: (i) collusion, (ii) monitoring, (iii) legitimacy, and (iv) career advance-
ment. While the collusion argument has been discussed above, the monitoring argu-
ment is that interlocks are created to better monitor the management.  Westphal and 
Zajac ( 1996 ) state that (the lack of) interlocks result(s) from the power struggle 
between the CEO and the board. Th ey fi nd that powerful CEOs select and retain pas-
sive board members in order to maintain control. In contrast powerful boards prefer 
new board candidates with monitoring experience. Furthermore, better monitoring is 
supposed to lead to better corporate performance.  Burt ( 1983 ) confi rms this expected 
positive relation between profi tability and interlocks, but  Dooley ( 1969 ) and  Lang and 
Lockhart ( 1990 ) draw opposite conclusions. In addition to the ambiguous results on 
the relation between interlocks and performance, another unresolved issue in these 
papers is causality. In other words, is it profi tability that triggers interlocks, or the other 
way around?  Richardson’s ( 1987 ) research provides some answers to the causality ques-
tion: his interviews with bankers confi rm that bankers oft en join boards of companies 
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in fi nancial diffi  culties. Th e legitimacy argument is that recruiting reputable directors 
onto the board earns the trust of investors and fi nancial institutions ( Scott,  1992 ). Most 
studies prior to the late 1990s have overlooked directors’ individual incentives to initi-
ate connections. Career advancement is one of the most prominent of individual moti-
vations to participate in director networks. On this topic, the pioneering studies by 
 Stokman et al. ( 1988 ) and  Zajac ( 1988 ) show that directors join other boards for rea-
sons of prestige and extra compensation. A recent empirical test by  Kirchmaier and 
Kollo ( 2007 ) confi rms the role of several individual factors, such as prestige, title, and 
education, which contribute to the expansion of director networks. 
 A motivation for the creation of director networks is their information value. More 
explicitly, director networks can transfer valuable information, knowledge, skills, and 
experience between companies.  Davis et al. ( 2003 ) study the composition of the small 
world of American corporate elite for the period 1982–2001 and fi nd that board mem-
bers who have been involved in crucial board decisions, for example mergers and acqui-
sitions (M&As) and business alliances, are more likely to be invited by other companies 
to serve as non-executive board members. Th is implies that director networks function 
as channels for gathering information for corporate decision-making.  Myint et al. ( 2005 ) 
present a case from the Cambridge hi-tech cluster and show that valuable multiple direc-
torships create new business opportunities and transfer management expertise. Another 
case study, conducted by  Shaw and Alexander ( 2006 ), documents the knowledge trans-
fer of supermarket retail techniques from North America to Britain. During the 1950s 
British supermarket retailers faced diffi  culties in adopting American methods of self-
service selling. Some of the British supermarket retailers (e.g. Tesco and Sainsbury) 
solved this problem by direct observation of the US market, but others (such as Melias) 
transferred the knowledge via shared directors aft er having gained control of an 
American supermarket retailer. Th ese cases provide textbook examples of how director 
networks can acquire knowledge and management experience to aid companies enter-
ing a new business (model). 
 Director Networks and Corporate 
Governance 
 We can categorize the literature on this topic into several strands: (i) M&A strategies, 
(ii) fi nancing opportunities, (iii) managerial compensation, (iv) managerial succession, 
and (v) corporate performance. 
 Th e fi rst strand of the literature is on interlocks and M&A strategies. Interlocked fi rms 
are more likely to adopt similar strategies, such as takeover defenses ( Davis  1991 ) and 
friendly acquisitions ( Palmer et al.,  1995 ).  D’Aveni and Kesner ( 1993 ) fi nd that takeover 
resistance is more likely to be weaker if top managers from the bidder and target are 
connected.  Haunschild ( 1993 ) studies 327 US fi rms in four industries and shows that 
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fi rms are more likely to engage in acquisitions if they are connected with other fi rms 
that have recently made acquisitions. Lastly, on the issue of the probability of being the 
target in a takeover,  Davis and Stout ( 1992 ) believe there is no association between the 
presence of a banker on the board and the likelihood of the fi rm being a target, whereas 
 Fligstein and Markowitz ( 1993 ) fi nd a positive correlation. Th e latter study also shows 
that bankers are oft en appointed to boards of fi rms experiencing fi nancial diffi  culties, 
which are likely to become takeover targets. 
 Th e second strand comprises fi nancing opportunities for which interlocks between 
fi rms and banks are of importance.  Ratcliff  ( 1980 ) fi nds that the interlocks of a bank are 
positively associated with corporate lending, but negatively associated with mortgage 
lending.  Stearns and Mizruchi ( 1993a ,  1993b ) document a positive association between 
the presence of a banker on a fi rm’s board and the additional fi nancing this fi rm attracts 
from that specifi c bank. Still, the study also suff ers from the typical causality problem. 
On the one hand, a banker’s presence in a fi rm may facilitate borrowing, but on the other 
hand, a fi rm with high leverage may invite a banker to its board. 
 In line with agency or tournament theories, director networks can be regarded as a 
tool for top managers to extend their power over the board in order to extract private 
benefi ts. Interlocks can also be indicators of busy boards (lacking time to monitor the 
fi rm) and hence ineff ective corporate governance. In the remainder of this section, we 
review the director network studies on managerial compensation, managerial turnover, 
and fi rm performance. 
 Cochran et al. ( 1985 ) fi nd that the proportion of outside directors is positively asso-
ciated with the top manager’s chance of receiving excessive severance pay, which is 
 confi rmed by  Singh and Harianto ( 1989 ),  Wade et al. ( 1990 ), and  Davis ( 1994 ). A likely 
explanation for this seemingly paradoxical fi nding is that the CEO appoints friends as 
outside directors in order to have little resistance to (controversial) corporate poli-
cies. Several studies following the seminal paper by  Hallock ( 1997 ) fi nd a positive cor-
relation between board interlocks and CEO compensation. Recent papers based on 
better measurement of director networks confi rm that a CEO’s compensation 
increases with his centrality level in his network ( Barnea and Guedj,  2009 ). Th e expla-
nation for this fi nding is that the CEO’s personal infl uence can be enhanced by the 
power derived from the network. Furthermore, non-executive directors serving on a 
board with a powerful CEO may be more lenient in the CEO’s remuneration contract 
design. Moreover, if a company has too many non-executive directors with outside 
directorships, this busy board may not be able to spend suffi  cient time on the fi rm’s 
policies (including the remuneration policy). Both eff ects can result in a suboptimal 
remuneration scheme that overpays the CEO or does not link pay to performance. 
Such a relationship between directors’ level of connectedness and their payment is 
also found by  Kuhnen ( 2006 ), and  Devos et al. ( 2006 ). An alternative explanation for 
the relation between CEO connectedness and pay is off ered by  Engelberg et al. ( 2009 ), 
who argue that companies pay their CEO for the connections. By counting the past 
connections, and the educational and social connections of the CEO,  Engelberg et al. 
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( 2009 ) fi nd that one additional connection to the CEO increases his total pay by up to 
10 percent. 
 Concerning the issue of managerial turnover and succession,  Fich and Shivdasani 
( 2006 ) and  Barnea and Guedj ( 2009 ) have analyzed the turnover decision of the CEO: 
better connected CEOs are less likely to be dismissed when performance of the com-
pany goes down. Not surprisingly, the turnover-performance sensitivity declines when 
the board is occupied by directors with many outside directorships. Moreover, evidence 
of the importance of weak ties ( Granovetter,  1973 ) is also found in the top managerial 
labor market.  Liu ( 2008 ) demonstrates that better connected candidates are more likely 
to be chosen as the new CEO (especially when they are external candidates). 
 How do director networks aff ect corporate performance? Th e early studies, con-
ducted by  Carrington ( 1981 ),  Meeusen and Cuyvers ( 1985 ), and  Baysinger and Butler 
( 1985 ), claim that there is either no correlation between interlocks and profi tability or a 
negative one. In the recent literature,  Carpenter and Westphal ( 2001 ) fi nd that strategi-
cally related interlocks improve board involvement when fi rms are in a stable business 
environment. When this environment is unstable, strategically heterogeneous links are 
proven to be more eff ective.  Ong et al. ( 2003 ),  Myint et al. ( 2005 ),  Hochberg et al. ( 2007 ), 
and  Gutierrez and Pombo ( 2010 ) show evidence that multiple directorships improve the 
performance of the company. Meanwhile  Kiel and Nicholson ( 2006 ) fi nd no evidence of 
a relationship between fi nancial performance and director connections. Recently, more 
studies show evidence of an adverse impact of director networks on performance, for 
example  Core et al. ( 1999 ),  Fich and White ( 2003 ),  Larcker et al. ( 2006 ),  Kuhnen ( 2006 ), 
 Santos et al. ( 2009 ),  Kirchmaier and Stathopoulos ( 2008 ), and  Subrahmanyam ( 2008 ). 
Some other researchers point to the relation between interlocks and poor corporate gov-
ernance. For instance, poor investor protection and lack of transparency contribute to 
synchronicity in returns data. In academic research, stock price synchronicity is oft en 
used as a measure of corporate governance effi  ciency.  Khanna and Th omas ( 2009 ) fi nd a 
signifi cantly positive relation between the degree of fi rm interlocks and stock price syn-
chronicity, which suggests that director networks between fi rms may harm corporate 
governance. 
 In general, there is much more past and current evidence on the detrimental eff ects of 
director networks on performance. However, one needs to be aware of the common 
drawbacks in this literature. First, the causality and endogeneity issues mentioned above 
remain an issue even in many recent studies. For instance, in studies on the relation 
between performance and director networks, it is important to realize that the positive 
correlation between connections and performance may not result from interlocks 
improving performance but from connections being a proxy for past good performance. 
Second, selection biases are prominent in director network research. Some studies focus 
on the largest companies only or on an industry, which may reduce the integrity of the 
key network measures used in these papers. Th ird, many (especially early) studies do 
not appropriately control for factors (such as CEO, board, fi rm, and industry character-
istics) that may infl uence the dependent variable, hampering the accuracy and general-
izability of the results. 
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 Analyzing Director Networks 
 Network Measures 
 Director networks can be measured or proxied in the following ways:
  • Th e existence of (external) connections 
 Th e basic method to quantify director networks consists of the use of dummy variables 
that identify whether directors are sitting on more than one board (they are then tagged 
as “connected”). Th e limitations of the dummy variable approach are obvious. A direc-
tor with multiple connections (sitting on more than two boards) is treated in the same 
way as a director with only one connection. Hence, the dummy variable approach fails 
to capture the impact of directors with large networks. Nor does it capture the location 
of a director in the overall network, which is important for network functions such as 
information gathering.
  • Th e basic centrality measure: degree or the number of connections 
 Degree stands for the number of directors connected to a specifi c director. By counting 
the number of connections, the level of connectedness of directors with multiple board 
positions can be compared. Variations on this theme consist of using the number of 
external board positions (external director connections). Th is simple approach has been 
widely used in academic research as an indicator of a manager’s network infl uence. 
However, it does not capture the positional advantage in the director networks, which 
makes the number of connections an inferior measure for studying the information col-
lection effi  ciency.
  • Other centrality measures 
 Developed within graph theory, centrality measures consist of the numbers and ratios 
that refl ect the network properties of a vertex in a graph. Centrality measures have been 
widely used in computer science, biology, and sociology studies, where network proper-
ties can aff ect individuals’ behavior. Centrality measures such as betweenness and close-
ness show how central a director is within the whole network, which makes them 
excellent measures of information collection effi  ciency. An example of how to calculate 
centrality measures can be found in the following sections. 
 Graph Theory in Practice 
 Figure  9.1 depicts the director network surrounding Andy Hornby, the CEO of HBOS 
plc, a banking and insurance company. In 2006, Andy Hornby was also a non-executive 
director in the life assurance and unit trust company St. James’s Place plc, and in the 
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retail companies GUS plc and Home Retail Group plc. Th is example is a fragment of a 
complete director network where a director is denoted by a  vertex (or node). A connec-
tion between two vertices is called a  link (or edge, tie). Th e system of these vertices and 
links is a  graph (or map). As links between two vertices are established when two direc-
tors are sitting on the same board, Andy Hornby’s four directorships create connections 
with 38 directors. Besides Andy Hornby, HBOS and St. James’s Place shared another two 
directors: Jo Dawson and James Crosby. Jo Dawson was an executive director in HBOS 
and a non-executive director in St. James’s Place. James Crosby was the CEO of HBOS 
before Andy Hornby. Similarly, GUS and Home Retail Group shared three directors, 
Oliver Stocken, John Coombe, and Terry Duddy. Oliver Stocken was a non-executive 
director in GUS and chairman of the board in Home Retail Group. John Coombe was a 
non-executive director of GUS and a senior non-executive director of Home Retail 
Group. Terry was an executive director of GUS and the CEO in Home Retail Group. 
 A sequence between two vertices, visiting no vertices more than once, is called a 
path. In  Figure  9.1 , there exist multiple paths between John Peace and Richard Ashton. 
For example: Peace—Duddy—Ashton, Peace—Stocken—Ashton, Peace—Coombe—
 figure 9.1. Example of a CEO’s professional network 
 Notes : Th is fi gure depicts the director networks surrounding Andy Hornby (white circle in the middle of the graph), who 
serves in four companies, including St. James’s Place (upper), HBOS (right), Home Retail Group (bottom), and GUS 
(left ). Directors in these four companies are represented as circles (vertices) around Andy Hornby. Directors 
in the same company are clustered together. Directors sitting on the same board established links between them. In this 
fi gure, the lines between circles represent the links between directors. Th e size of a circle is proportional to the 
number of links it has. 
 Source :  Renneboog and Zhao ( 2011 ). 
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Hughes—Ashton and etc. Th e length of a path is the number of links it comprises and a 
 geodesic path is the shortest path between two vertices (which is not necessarily unique). 
In the above example, both Peace—Duddy—Ashton and Peace—Stocken—Ashton are 
both geodesic paths between Peace and Ashton. 
 A CEO’s network grows stronger when he accepts more external directorships. 
Reciprocal interlocks (the mutual exchange of directors) also occur more frequently. 
Such a network can be used to extend CEO power which could enable the CEO to infl u-
ence board decision-making (possibly to his own benefi t). Th e connections built for 
the purpose of accumulating managerial infl uence are referred to as  managerial infl u-
ence -oriented connections. Networks not only increase a director’s infl uence but also 
bring additional skills, knowledge, and information to the company, which may lead to 
corporate governance and performance improvements. Connections maintained for 
the sake of information collection are referred to as  information value- oriented con-
nections. Centrality measures that capture the level of connectedness in the local region 
based on adjacent connections are called the  direct centrality measures (degree, eigen-
vector centrality). Th ey are used to measure managerial infl uence-oriented connec-
tions. Centrality measures that analyze the position of a director in the entire network 
based on distances between target director and other directors are called  indirect cen-
trality measures (e.g. closeness and betweenness). Th ey are used to evaluate information 
value-oriented networks. In order to explain various centrality measures, we construct a 
hypothetical network ( Figure  9.2 ) with six companies and ten directors. In  Table  9.1 , the 
numbers refer to fi rms and letters stand for directors ( Table  9.1 , Panel A). 
 Th e  degree centrality of a vertex is calculated as the number of links held by that vertex. 
In the above example, the number of links for director  a is 6, so director  a has degree cen-









 figure 9.2. A director network graph 
 Note : Th is fi gure is a hypothetical director network graph used for centrality illustration. 
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directors in company 3 and four directors in company 5. Note that as degree counts the v 
vaff ected by factors infl uencing board size. 
 Th e  closeness of a vertex is defi ned as the sum of geodesic distances between this vertex 
and all other vertices that can be reached. Higher closeness value in fact suggests the 
vertex is further from other vertices. Th us this defi nition of closeness is also referred to 
 Table 9.1. An example of a director network 
 Panel A: Example of a network 
 Company  Director  Company  Director 
 1  a  5  a 
  5  b 
 2  b  5  j 
 2  c  5  f 
  5  d 
 3  a  
 3  e  6  b 
 3  f  6  g 
  6  d 
 4  h  6  e 
 4  d  6  h 
 4  i  6  i 
 4  j  
 Panel B: Centrality measures 
  Degree  Closeness  Eigenvector  Betweenness 
 a  6  12  0.299  0.167 
 b  9  9  0.379  8.933 
 C  1  17  0.054  0.000 
 d  8  10  0.372  0.933 
 e  7  11  0.336  0.567 
 f  7  11  0.336  0.567 
 g  6  12  0.299  0.167 
 h  6  12  0.293  0.367 
 i  8  10  0.372  0.933 
 j  6  12  0.293  0.367 
 Notes : Th e panels explain how director networks are mathematically recorded 
and calculated. Panel A is an overview of the example network. Panel B shows 
the basic centrality measures  calculated for this example network. 
 Source :  Renneboog and Zhao ( 2011 ). 
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as “farness” by some scholars. Another way to defi ne closeness, which is more com-
monly used in the research, is to calculate the inverse of the sum of all geodesic paths 
from the focal vertex to any other vertex. Compared to the previous defi nition, the high 
closeness value here means a shorter distance to all other vertices, which suggests the 
target vertex is more central in the network. 
 Th e  eigenvector centrality of a vertex equals the sum of all adjacent vertices’ eigenvec-
tor centrality scores. Th is calculation process begins with assigning a random score to 
all the vertices. At each iteration, the score of vertex  v is calculated as the sum of all adja-
cent vertices’ scores received in the previous iteration multiplied by a constant. Th is 
process is repeated for a suffi  cient number of times until the eigenvector centrality for 
each vertex is stable. Th e advantage of eigenvector centrality over other centrality meas-
ures is that it does not only capture how many vertices are linked to the target vertex (as 
degree centrality does), but also includes the centrality of those adjacent vertices (the 
degree of these linked vertices). Hence, a vertex will have a higher eigenvector centrality 
score if it is connected to more vertices with higher centrality scores. 
 Th e  betweenness of a vertex is defi ned as the sum of its betweenness ratios. Th e 
betweenness ratio is the number of geodesic paths from any other two vertices (say  s and 
 t ) passing through the focal vertex, divided by the number of all geodesic paths between 
 s and  t . In the above example, no geodesic path needs to pass director  c , therefore his 
betweenness score is zero. Director  b has a high betweenness score, because  b is the only 
director connected to  c . Th us, geodesic paths between director  c and all the other direc-
tors need to pass director  b , which leads to the high betweenness score of director  b . 
 Th e resulting centrality measures for all directors in the above example can be seen in 
Panel B below. 
 Degree and eigenvector centrality measures focus on direct connections to adjacent 
vertices only. Closeness and betweenness analyze the distance between the target vertex 
and all other vertices (closeness) or the position of the target vertex on other geodesic 
paths (betweenness). Th erefore, we categorize degree and eigenvector centrality meas-
ures as direct measures. Closeness and betweenness are regarded as indirect measures. 
Networks designed to accumulate managerial infl uence and information collection 
ability can be measured by diff erent types of centrality measures. A CEO with many 
external directorships which contribute to his reputation and fame among the con-
nected companies may be more infl uential. Such infl uence is captured by the direct 
measures. Valuable information can spread through the connections in the network and 
reach directors depending on network structure. A higher closeness score implies a 
shorter distance to other vertices, in which case the CEO is able to acquire the informa-
tion earlier. A CEO’s high betweenness score implies that he may be standing on the 
“brokerage position” between some otherwise separated groups. Such a position 
enhances the probability that a CEO receives new information earlier. Hence, centrality 
measures capturing indirect links (closeness and betweenness) are used to measure the 
access to information through networks. One may argue that direct connections bring 
in information as well. Th is is true, but direct centrality measures are inferior to indirect 
ones in terms of quantifying information collection effi  ciency. For instance, directors 
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with numerous direct connections in an isolated corner of the whole network can hardly 
receive information as quickly as directors in the center of the network (even with fewer 
direct connections). Moreover, as suggested by  Granovetter ( 1973 ), information from 
direct connections is likely to be of lower quality than that from distant connections, 
because directly connected individuals tend to have redundant (similar) information 
sources. Th erefore, the indirect centrality measures are better proxies of the information 
collection effi  ciency of the CEO’s director network. 
 Renneboog and Zhao ( 2011 ) examine the relation between directors’ networks, 
CEO compensation, and pay-for-performance. Th ey distinguish between two func-
tions of networks: the accumulation of managerial infl uence and the collection of 
valuable information and resources. Th e former implies that powerful CEOs may take 
advantage of their position to extract high benefi ts such as compensation at a cost to 
the shareholders. Th e latter function is benefi cial to the company (and the director). 
Th e existing literature does not allow for this diff erence, but they make this distinc-
tion by employing  network centrality measures at the direct and indirect levels. 
Strong direct networks (measured by degree and eigenvector centrality) proxy for 
managerial infl uence, whereas strong indirect networks (measured by closeness and 
betweenness) proxy for the information-collection value.  Renneboog and Zhao ( 2011 ) 
fi nd that both strong direct and indirect networks are rewarded by higher compensa-
tion (fi xed salary, bonus, and equity-based compensation) and that pay-for- 
performance sensitivity decreases in the direct centrality measure. Th e combination 
of high CEO compensation and low pay-for-performance corroborates the manage-
rial infl uence hypothesis. While the information value of indirect networks is refl ected 
in higher CEO compensation, this function of networks does not infl uence the pay-
for-performance relation. 
 Director Networks from 
Non-professional Origins 
 Directors do not only have networks through their executive and non-executive posi-
tions on corporate boards ( professional networks ), but also develop networks that origi-
nate from shared high school, college, or university education, elite or sports club 
memberships, or other social occasions ( social networks ).  Kirchmaier and Kollo ( 2007 ) 
and  Hwang and Kim ( 2009 ) demonstrate that the larger a director’s social network, the 
higher is his compensation.  Engelberg et al. ( 2009 ) and  Brown et al. ( 2009 ) discover that 
past connections are also important components in the CEO networks and also have a 
positive impact on the size of executive compensation. Furthermore, the authors discuss 
the social connections’ negative impact on pay-for-performance sensitivity and turno-
ver-for-performance sensitivity. Lastly,  Kirchmaier and Stathopoulos ( 2008 ) fi nd that a 
CEO’s social networks hamper fi rm performance. 
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 In most of the existing literature on networks, only one type of network is analyzed 
(usually the professional network), which jeopardizes the integrity of the measurement 
of director networks and aff ects the accuracy of centrality measures. In order to solve 
this problem, one needs to consider director networks from diff erent origins simultane-
ously. Th e current professional connections form the  primary network . Connections 
from all other origins (including past professional networks) form  secondary networks . 
Th e aggregation of all such types of networks is referred to as the  hybrid network of a 
director. Secondary networks can enhance or supplement the primary one. For exam-
ple, managers with the same education background (a degree from the same school) 
may be more closely related than otherwise. Secondary networks can also establish links 
between people not connected through primary networks. For example, directors work-
ing for diff erent companies can still be friends with each other thanks to their common 
club membership. 
 Renneboog and Zhao ( 2010b ) study the hybrid director network and its impact on 
CEO compensation. Th ey hypothesize that the directors’ primary networks (current 
professional connections) are “enhanced” by secondary networks based on past director 
connections, educational connections, and connections based on nationality. Th eir 
results confi rm that director networks enhanced by means of past, educational, and 
nationality relations are positively correlated with a CEO’s total remuneration while 
controlling for many other explanations, including corporate performance and owner-
ship concentration. 
 Corporate Networks and Other 
Corporate Governance Issues 
 Besides CEO compensation and turnover, other corporate governance issues may be 
related to director networks.  Renneboog and Zhao ( 2010a ) study the CEO labor market 
and director networks. Th eir results show that a CEO’s direct networks (capturing man-
agerial power) shield him from dismissal when performance drops; CEOs’ information 
collection networks improve their chances of departing from their current position. 
 M&As may be based on decisions infl uenced by networks as connections facilitate stra-
tegic information transmission between companies. When an executive director holds a 
non-executive position in another fi rm, more information about the latter company (e.g. 
its suitability as a takeover target) may fl ow to the former fi rm.  Ishii and Xuan ( 2010 ) fi nd 
evidence that connected CEOs have a larger chance of being rewarded with a larger bonus 
for completing an M&A transaction. Th ey also demonstrate that abnormal stock returns 
are lower and that more target fi rm directors are retained in the combined company if the 
target and the acquirer were connected through their directors prior to the M&A. 
 CEO and director insider trading may result from lack of monitoring and/or leakage 
of price-sensitive information. Both factors may be induced by director networks. 
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Networks may yield directors better information access, which enables them to spot 
insider trading opportunities in the connected companies. Th erefore, we expect that 
well-connected directors are more likely to trade on insider information. 
 Recently, the network of remuneration consultants has been studied. An interesting 
fi nding is that CEO compensation increases with the number of remuneration consult-
ants hired by the company, ceteris paribus ( Conyon et al.,  2009 and  Kabir and Minhat, 
 2010 ). When two companies are hiring the same remuneration consultant, they can be 
considered connected through the remuneration consultant’s networks.  Renneboog 
and Zhao ( 2011 ) fi nd that companies are more generous with CEO compensation when 
the remuneration consultant networks they belong to are larger. 
 Conclusion and Future Research Agenda 
 In this chapter, we have shown the infl uence of director networks on corporate governance 
in the past and today. We have reviewed the development of director networks since the 
early 20th century and summarized the main regulatory changes. In order to get a better 
understanding of director networks, we have presented a survey of director network 
research and illustrated the most common and latest research on network measurement. 
Several studies point out that director networks have a signifi cant impact on remunera-
tion, turnover, and some other corporate governance issues. In remuneration-related 
studies, most researchers conclude that excessive director networks contribute to large and 
ineffi  cient CEO compensation. Analysis with advanced network measures further reveals 
that CEOs use director networks to accumulate managerial power and acquire larger com-
pensation without achieving better performance. In research on director networks and the 
managerial labor market, the results suggest that the managerial labor market is infl uenced 
by networks: directors with larger networks are more likely to fi nd new positions. Lastly, 
the debate on whether director networks aff ect fi rm performance is still unclear. On one 
hand, director networks can be abused and can shift  the balance of power in the board-
room to the CEO. On the other hand, director networks bring information and expertise 
into the company, which is particularly valuable when the fi rm is entering a new business 
or considering takeovers. To sum up, director networks research—a new research area in 
fi nancial economics with continuously advancing techniques—has already generated 
many interesting results. Th is interdisciplinary research still has signifi cant academic 
potential. We summarize a few topics for the future research agenda. 
 Methodology 
 Th e endogeneity problem in director network studies has not been solved. For instance, 
in the relationship between performance and networks the causality problem still 
remains: do networks lead to better performance or do networks merely refl ect past 
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corporate performance (as refl ected in the number of outside directorships a director 
subsequently accumulates)? More advanced econometric techniques and carefully 
chosen instrumental variables may contribute to the resolution of this problem. 
 Scope of Networks 
 Currently, in most studies only directors’ professional connections are used to map net-
works. Yet professional connections are only one part of the true network. A more com-
prehensive network should also contain past (professional) connections as well as links 
based on common educational background, membership of social, elite, or sports clubs, 
nationality etc. Although the private nature of non-professional connections makes data 
collection on social networks diffi  cult, some early attempts on social connections show 
promising results. 
 Network eff ects on corporate governance 
 Th e role of networks could still be studied further for some more aspects of corporate 
decision-making. For instance, M&A activity may be infl uenced by director networks. 
Also, cross-country studies on director network eff ects should also become more 
prominent because director networks are shaped by local regulation and local culture. 
Th us director networks are likely to diff er in their structures and impacts across 
countries. 
 Notes 
 1.  For instance, in the US, the Council of Institutional Investors proposes that full-time direc-
tors should have no more than two other directorships. In the UK, full-time executive direc-
tors should not have directorships in other FTSE 100 companies. 
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